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Restructuring of the Electric Utility Industry:
Free Markets and Environmental Protection

Summary
The investor-owned electric industry has been characterized for over 70 years by forprofit vertically integrated utilities that provide power to an exclusive, monopoly
franchise service territory. In return for these monopoly rights, utilities were and are
subject to both Federal and state regulation. Utilities in the West rely on coal,
nuclear and hydroelectricity to meet nearly all electric power needs Hydropower, as
a very inexpensive resource, is utilized during peak periods to maximize economic
benefits. Thus, the flow of many Western rivers is tied to the roller-coaster electrical
demands of the populations that inhabit the West. Under the present system, the
associated environmental impacts can be addressed through regulatory and statutory
processes.

Utility economics have changed over the last twenty-five years, particularly with
respect to generation. Inexpensive non-utility energy resources now represent a
credible alternative to traditional monopoly utility electric service. The utility
response to this competitive threat has been to adopt a very short-term planning
horizon, and use their market power to protect or enhance their competitive position.
This may come at the expense of long-term customer and public interests. I submit
that the vertically integrated structure is either causing or exacerbating many of the
major regulatory problems of the day.

In the last few years, a number of states have adopted proposals that would allow
electric customers to select their own supplier in the same way that consumers can
now choose between AT&T, MCI, and Sprint for long-distance phone service.
Within this new market-oriented industry structure, there is likely to be significantly
fewer regulatory options available to manage the adverse environmental impacts
associated with the electric industry. At the same time, a new electric industry is
being created that can be structured to fund and protect a variety of environmental

mitigation efforts. New industry models on the table range from those that
incorporate incentive and other creative mechanisms, to divestiture models which
directly address the underlying structural problems. In addition, many players argue
that Federal hydropower should be pan of this equation. On balance, we believe that
the opportunities arising from electric industry restructuring greatly outwei gh the
risks.

Context: The Electric Utility Industry
A.

The Utilities: The present industry is based upon economics, reliability, and
franchised service territories. Investor-owned utilities are usually verticallyintegrated, i.e. both manufacture (generate) and deliver (distribute) the
product. Publicly-owned utilities are most often delivery companies, owning
just the wires. However, these entities sometimes collectively acquire
generation resources.
1.

An existing inte grated utility has been historically able to provide many
energy related services more efficiently than new entrants to the
market.

2.

Single regulated entities usually can develop a more reliable system,
especially transmission and distribution, than many competing entities,
particularly in the same service area.
Economies of scale allowed larger entities, or joint ventures, to build
new energy supplies and reduce the avera ge cost.

B.

The Re gulation: Federal regulators have authority over wholesale and
interstate transactions, while state regulators control retail (end-use) electricity
and generation siting decisions.
1.

Regulation acts as a proxy for-the competitive marketplace. avoidina
duplication of facilities, such as the wires.

2.

Franchised service territories are provided to utilities in exchan ge for a
utility obligation to serve all customers requestin g service in that
territory.

0

3.

The regulators assure economic fairness to large and small customers,
and to suppliers, in terms of rates, and terms and conditions for
services.

4.

Regulation also assures that the public interest obli gations of utilities
are fulfilled.

C.

Energy Supply: The types of supply include those requiring combustion,
nuclear, and renewable resources. Traditionally owned by a sin gle or a group
of utilities, fossil-fuel fired energy supplies have depended on economies of
scale to minimize costs. The majority of hydroelectric in the West are owned
by the Federal government and marketed throu gh a number of different power
marketing agencies.
1.

Fossil: In the West, the vast majority of energy is produced by
burning coal. The initial capital cost is relatively high, but the variable
fuel cost is very low. Conversely, the natural gas commodity is far
more expensive, but the plant costs are low, thus it is primarily used
for peakin g purposes.

2.

Nuclear: Excluding California, there is only one operatin g nuclear
power plant in the West. Nuclear power turned out to be far more
expensive than anyone thought 20-30 years ago.

3.

Hydropower: These facilities are owned both privately and publicly.
The lion's share (about 90% in the Rocky Mountains and Desert
Southwest) is owned by the Federal government, operated by the
Bureau of Reclamation, and marketed -by power marketin g agencies
such as the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA). The
beneficiaries of this very low cost power are "preference customers."
i.e. usually rural cooperatives and municipals.

4.

Renewables: The so-called "dry" renewables, wind and solar, exist in
abundance in the West. The Desert Southwest offers perhaps the best
solar energy resource in the country, if not the world. Parts of
California, Idaho, Montana, Colorado, and Wyoming have very
3

attractive wind regimes. Wind energy is fast approachin g costcompetitive levels, while solar energy continues to be three to four
times more expensive than fossil-fueled alternatives.
III.

Hydropower Resources: The Status Quo
A.

Economics: Ori ginally constructed for irrigation, river regulation and flood
control, and recreation, hydroelectricity was seen as an incidental benefit,
generating revenue to help pay the capital costs of these facilities. With most,
if not all, of the capital costs paid off, and extremely low operatin g costs, the
energy generated is inexpensive and helps to keep the overall cost of electricity
reasonable in rural areas.

B.

Environmental Impacts: The good news: None of the impacts associated with
fossil-fuel acquisition and combustion result from hydropower, such as mining
and drilling activities, air quality effects, or hazardous or toxic material
releases. The not-so-good news: Hydroelectric development and operation
does have environmental impacts. The flow of the rivers is tied inextricably to
the electrical demands of the populations that inhabit the West. When the
Desert Southwest turns on its air conditioning, there's a flood in the Grand
Canyon. The existence and present operations of the dams has three important
impacts:
1.

The river's natural flow patterns fluctuate between a trickle and a
flood, disrupting the regimen to which native species have adapted.

2.

Silts and nutrients, vital-to downstream life both in the river and along
its floodplain, are kept behind the dam and settle to the bottom of the
reservoir.

3.

The temperature of the water, both behind the dam and downstream
from it, is altered in ways that affect fish and biological activity.

C.

Operations: As a result of a Department of Interior Environmental Impact
Statement and more recently, the Grand Canyon Protection Act, the operations
of Glen Canyon dam have been changed to address these environmental

impacts. While the total energy generated will remain about the same, the
change will diminish the amount available at any one time by spreadin g the
generation more evenly throughout the day and year.

IV.

Competition: The advent of competition has affected virtually every corner of the
electric utility industry.
A.

Economics of Energy Supply: Statutory changes and technological advances
have significantly changed the economics. Encouragement of the development
of non-utility power production, and a requirement for utilities to allow open
access to their transmission systems stimulated both the demand for customer
choice from alternative energy Suppliers and the ability of suppliers to reach
new markets. At the same time the historic econorriies of scale for generation
resources chan ged markedly, resulting in lower mar ginal costs for new energy
resources than the average cost of existin g utility generation.

B.

Regulation: The re gulatory processes, and in many cases le gislatures. are
adapting to and promoting competitive changes. while at the same time
establishing policies which retain the fairness, equity, and reliability of the
electrical systems:
1.

FERC Order 888: Established a nation-wide open access policy for
transmission systems. Commissionei Hoecker Commented
"Restructuring the electric power industry is a Matter of national
interest and priority."

2.

Several bills have been introduced at the Federal level.

3.

Virtually every state is actively examinin g competition and
restructuring.
a. Several states have already adopted restructurin g rules, policies.
and procedures, while many other states had bills in legislatures
this past session.

C.

Public Interests: The mere threat of competition, gainin g momentum over the
last decade, has impacted integrated utility operations. Large and powerful
5

energy consumers are demanding the economic benefits of competition, and
utilities are succumbing to this pressure. Thus, many utilities are already
acting as if competition exists today.
1.

Many utilities have established earnings sharing plans, reducin g their
competitive exposure by capturing large portions of the economic
benefits of growth and cost-reduction efforts.

2.

The threat of large customer bypass has motivated incumbent utilities to
find creative ways to reduce costs assigned to these customers, and
attempt to acquire long-term commitments through contractual
arrangements.

3.

Favorable consumer and environmental public interest programs
developed under regulation are capped, reduced, or eliminated.

4.

Reliability may be threatened by cost reductions not limited to the
competitive portion of business. This contributed to the summer 1996
Western system power outages

D.

Effects on non-hydro ener gy resources: Competition seems likely to drive
prices down, favoring the lowest cost resource.
1.

Fossil fuel: Old. uncontrolled (pre-NSPS plants) coal plants are likely
to run more due to their depreciated investment and low variable cost,
adding to emission related effects such as visibility degradation and
causing si gnificant environmental impacts on the land-. New
competitive plants will likely be

combined-cycle gas plants which have

relatively low capital investment and much higher efficiencies.
2.

Demand-side resources (energy efficiency and conservation) should be
appealing to customer-oriented distribution companies. Renewableresources other than hydropower may find it tou gher to compete on a
pure cost basis, however new marketin g programs targetin g customers'
environmental values may overcome the cost barrier.

E.

Impact of Competition on Hydropower Facilities: Competition appears less
likely to affect operations than environmental considerations. However,

players in a competitive industry may apply significant pressure to share the
benefits among a wider group of constituencies.
1.

Present contractual arrangements, i.e. preference power. benefits
municipal and cooperative utilities. These parties would clearly like to
retain these benefits, and are pressin g for 20 year extensions of many
contracts which expire in 2004.

2.

Investor-owned utilities and independent power producers have made
unsolicited buyout proposals for ri ghts to this inexpensive resource.

3.

Several Federal legislative initiatives have occurred in the last few
years, proposing various plans to sell the power marketin g agencies.

4.

Renewable resources: Resources such as wind and solar are dependent
on an intermittent energy source, not always available on demand.
Thus, using a relatively small portion of the existing hydro resource to
support these dry renewables would facilitate their development and
accelerate cost reductions.
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The Restructuring Opportunity: Shaping a workable restructured electric industry will
require a balancing of many diverse interests. The promise of lower prices resulting
from competition creates opportunities to address environmental issues. The same
forces place at risk up to $200 billion in electric utility industry investment nationally.
To maximize recovery of this investment, the industry may be willing to compromise
in areas that we, as environmentalists, care about. For example, the dams could be
operated in a fashion similar to Glen Canyon, renewables portfolios standards can be
introduced, and funding vehicles such as wires charges for public interests can be
implemented.
A.

Balancing. Diverse Interests: Small consumer and environmental interests are
ali g ned in many ways as public interests. Lar ge consumers and independent
power producers are motivated by the economics of a competitive supply
regime. Utilities are focused on increasing their competitiveness throu gh cost
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minimization, and retaining customers through contractual commitments while

the generation monopoly lasts. A workable system must address the balance
between customers and shareholders of utilities, amon g various customer
groups. and among resource options.
B-.

Market Power: Present utilities are vertically integrated. i.e. the same entity
that controls the delivery system also owns generation, providin g a potential
for abuses including price discrimination and anti-competitive behaviors.
Mergers and consolidation of generation assets can exacerbate these effects.
Divestiture of competitive assets can help to eliminate them.

VI.

Competitive Models: The process of shaping a competitive electric industry is
underway throughout the country, and is evolving through regulatory and legislative
initiatives. Other models have also been proposed.
A.

Regulatory/Legislative Model: The direction of many states is to phase-in
competition in two or three steps over a period of years. A key component is
to fairly allocate recovery of costs "stranded" by competition to protect utility
shareholders and balance competing customer interests, while retaining funding
for important public interest pro grams. Moreover, this model often includes a
price cap or reduction for all customers. Further, open access to the
competitive marketplace is assured to help mitigate the incumbent's market
power.

B.

Alternative Divestiture/Non-profit Model: This model unbundles the
vertically-integrated utilities into their competitive and monopoly business
components. The benefits of se gregating conflicting businesses include
increasing overall shareholder value (the sum of the pans bein g greater than
the integrated whole) and eliminatin g market power concerns. Taking the
additional step of convertin g the monopoly business into a public utility district
or non-profit cooperative aligns the interests of the owners and customers by
making them one and the same. Additionally, it can reduce costs by
eliminatin g Federal income tax expense and potentially providin g access to less
expensive financing.
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1.

Financial benefits are thus created for shareholders throu gh a premium
on the sale of monopoly assets, and ratepayers throu gh reduced costs.
Finally, the non-profit distribution company has the proper incentives to
protect public interests because the customers are the owners.
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